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Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit
on Eminent Domain
James Geoffrey Durham*
INTRODUCTION
Theoretically, eminent domain1 is an equitable compromise
between the needs of the public and the rights of the individ-
ual. The fifth amendment permits the government to acquire
privately owned land, but only if the land is taken for a "public
use" and the property owner is paid "just compensation" for
the taking.2 Eminent domain thus appears to provide an effi-
cient balancing of public and private interests. The government
is not precluded from acquiring needed land because the prop-
erty owner either refused to sell or demanded a prohibitively
high price for the land.3 The government's exercise of eminent
domain is constrained, however, by the "public use" require-
ment, which demands that the anticipated use of the property
* Associate Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the criticisms and suggestions made by Professor
Thomas Ross of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Professor Harry
S. Gerla of the University of Dayton School of Law, and Joan Drake Durham,
Attorney at Law.
1. Eminent domain is the legal procedure by which a governmental en-
tity can forcibly acquire land owned by a private party. 1 P. NICHOLS, NICHOLS
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (J. Sackman & P. Rohen rev. 3d ed. 1983); see
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson. 98 US.
403, 406 (1878).
2. U.S. CONST. a .end. V. The "public use" requirement has been explic-
itly held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Ha-
waii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (1984). Although it is not
clear whether the fifth amendment's "just compensation" requirement is simi-
larly incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, the requirement is held ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth amendments due process clause.
See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254 (1934); Cincinnati v. Louis-
ville & N.RPR Co., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912); Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U.S. 524,
531 (1911). See generally 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 7.01.
3. This assumes that the adage "every person has a price" is incorrect.
Assuming that there are property owners who will refuse to sell at any price
may be unrealistic, but it is quite realistic to assume that there are property
owners who will refuse to sell for the maximum price that a governmental
agency would be willing to pay. In effect, the result is the same.
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be for public purposes.4 In addition, the "just compensation"
requirement deters the government's use of eminent domain
when the taking will be economically inefficient because the
costs of "just compensation" will outweigh the public benefit of
the taking.5
Enforcement of these checks depends almost entirely on
the judicial definitions given to "public use" and "just compen-
sation" and on the judicial deference given to legislative deter-
minations that a taking meets these definitions. Courts have
failed to enforce these checks on eminent domain, however,
either by denying that they have the power to substantively re-
view uses of eminent domain or by reducing their review to a
mechanical application of an established legalistic formula.
"Public use" has thus been defined so broadly that little if any-
thing will not fall within the meaning of the term.6 In the re-
cent decision of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the
Supreme Court made the definition of "public use" largely ir-
relevant by holding that courts must defer to the legislative de-
termination that a taking is in the public use unless such a
determination is irrational or an "impossibility. ' 7
With the "public use" requirement receiving only minimal
judicial supervision, the "just compensation" requirement be-
comes the sole viable judicial check on governmental exercises
of eminent domain.8 In United States v. 50 Acres of Land
(Duncanville),9 the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that
just compensation is presumptively the market value of the
property interest taken by eminent domain. 10 Market value,
4. See, e.g., Midkiff 104 S. Ct. at 2329-30 (action must be taken for the
public welfare).
5. If, of course, the government's cost of "just compensation" is less than
the actual costs of the eminent domain action, the government may not be de-
terred from pursuing an inefficient eminent domain action in which the aggre-
gate costs exceed the aggregate benefit. The deterrence value of the "just
compensation" check thus depends on the definition given to "just compensa-
tion." It is the thesis of this Article that "just compensation" must be defined
to include all costs incurred by property owners to be an effective linlt on gov-
ernmental use of eminent domain actions.
6. See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
7. 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
8. As one author has noted:
Apart from the requirement of compensation, there is no limit on the
extent to which a selfish majority in the community may appropriate
for their own benefits the invested savings of fortuitously selected
individuals.
W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: A CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 46 (1974).
9. 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984).
10. Id at 455.
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however, often does not adequately measure all the costs that
the property owner and others bear because of the taking?'
The cost/benefit analysis of the government, therefore, be-
comes skewed, and the government may not be deterred from
undertaking inefficient eminent domain actions in which the
aggregate costs of the taking exceed its aggregate benefits.12
The burdens of an inefficient eminent domain action will neces-
sarily fall on a minority of the population, and the fifth amend-
ment's theoretical equitable compromise will become
inequitable in reality.13
This Article contends that the governmental power of emi-
nent domain must be limited and that the best way of doing so
is to require state and federal governments to reimburse prop-
erty owners for all "large, fairly concrete and roughly mone-
tizeable"14 costs resulting from the taking of their land. Part I
briefly reviews the traditional law of public use and the
Midkciff decision, and Part H reviews the traditional law of just
compensation and the Duncanville decision. Part III addresses
the ineffectual political check on the use of eminent domain
and discusses the need for a judicial limit on the power. Fi-
nally, Part IV proposes that just compensation should include
all costs that the government should consider in its efficiency
analysis of the eminent domain decision and determines which
categories of costs incurred by owners and others affected by an
eminent domain action should fall within this analysis. This fi-
11. See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
12. Not only will these actions be inefficient because costs are greater
than benefits, but the actions will not reach Pareto Optimality. Pareto Op-
tinality is only reached when no person may be made better off without mak-
ing another worse off. See P. ASCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST
DILEMMA 18 (1970); A. POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
7 nA (1983). In eminent domain actions, therefore, Pareto Optimality is
achieved when the owners of the property taken are fully compensated for the
costs of the actions.
13. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), explained the equitable theory
underlying the fifth amendment, stating that the fifth amendment "was
designed to bar the government from forcing some individuals to bear burdens
which, in all fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole." Icd at 656
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Leslie Pickering Francis expanded this
idea in her recent article on eminent domain: "Fairness to the individual
seems to require that he or she not bear a disproportionate share of the cost of
a public improvement, especially since the property transfer is involuntary."
Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western States: A Critique of the
Fair Market Value Mode, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1984).
14. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORi 23 (1982); see infra notes
158-59 and accompanying text.
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nal Part further analyzes the impact that efficient just compen-
sation would have had on the eminent domain decisions
involved in Midkiff and Duncanville.
I. "PUBLIC USE" AND MIDKIFF
Historically, courts rigidly defined "public use" to require
that the public have physical access to the property after acqui-
sition by eminent domain.1 5 In response to social change and
the practical needs of an industrializing nation, this rigid defini-
tion of public use eventually gave way to a more flexible mean-
ing.16 Public use became a fluid concept, with no one definition
emerging except that the intended purpose of the eminent do-
main action must somehow benefit the public.17 The definition
of public use thus expanded beyond acquisitions for public
roads and bridges18 to acquisitions for railroads19 and privately
owned mills,20 and to what may be the ultimate public acquisi-
tion, a professional football team.21
Modern courts only rarely find that the intended purpose
of the eminent domain action is not in the public use.2 2 Those
15. Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent
Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 355, 360 (1983); Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 588-90 (1972). See generally 2A P.
NICHOL , supra note 1, at § 7.02[1] (private use considered spoliation).
16. Ross, supra note 15, at 361 n.20. As Professor Thomas Ross notes, this
evolution was not uniform. Some early courts applied a very broad definition
of public use, whereas other courts persisted in applying a restrictive defini-
tion. Id; see also 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 7.02[2] (compiling defini-
tions of public use applied by different courts).
17. Ross, supra note 15, at 361-62.
18. See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 710 (1923)
(roads); Valmont Dev. Co. v. Rosser, 297 Pa. 140, 147, 146 A. 557, 560 (1929)
(bridges). See generally 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at §§ 7.22, 7.27 (collect-
ing cases).
19. See generally 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 7.51 (collecting cases).
20. See generally id. at § 7.70 (collecting cases).
21. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982). In Oakland Raiders, the city of Oakland, seeking to pre-
vent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles, brought an eminent
domain action to acquire all those property rights associated with the football
team. The trial court granted summary judgment, resting, in part, on Oak-
land's inability to establish a valid public use. The California Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for trial, stating that the acquisition and operation of a
sports franchise might be in the interests of public health, recreation, and en-
joyment and, therefore, a public use. Id. at 70-73, 646 P.2d at 841-43, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 679-81. For later proceedings, see City of Oakland v. Superior Ct., 136
Cal. App. 3d 565, 186 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1982); City of Oakland v. Superior Ct., 150
Cal. App. 3d 267, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983).
22. Ross, supra note 15, at 359.
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infrequent occasions in which courts do find an absence of pub-
lic use usually involve "private-transferee" takings, or actions
in which the government intends to transfer the property taken
to a private party.23 Until recently, courts adopting this limita-
tion to the public use definition were forced to either distin-
guish 24 or ignore25 a facially contrary Supreme Court
precedent-Berman v. Parker26-or to rely on state constitu-
tional provisions.2 After the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,2 8 only the latter course
remains open to a court disturbed by such a private-transferee
taking.
In Berman, a department store owner challenged the tak-
ing of his store by the District of Columbia as part of a redevel-
opment scheme for southwest Washington, D.C.29 The
Supreme Court found the eminent domain action constitutional
under the fifth amendment, even though most of the land ac-
quired was to be sold to private developers.30 The district court
had determined that the taking was constitutional only because
the redevelopment area involved slums with "conditions injuri-
ous to the public health, safety, morals and welfare," elimina-
tion of which was a public end.31 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected such close judicial scrutiny and affirmed on the
broader grounds of deference to Congress on what constitutes
the "public welfare":
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have
made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.
It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in
the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear... Here
2 3. Id-
24. See, eg., Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788,796-97 (9th Cir. 1983), re'd, 104
S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
25. See, ag., Continential Enters., Inc. v. Cain, 180 Ind. App. 106, 110, 387
N.E.2d 86, 90 (1979).
26. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
27. See, ag., Bacrol Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla.
1975); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 5-6 (Ky. 1979); Phillips
v. Foster, 215 Va. 543, 546-47, 211 S.E.2d 93, 96 (1975); In re City of Seattle, 96
Wash. 2d 616, 625-27, 638 P.2d 549, 555-56 (1981).
28. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
29. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 716-25 (D.D.C.
1953), modified and affd sub nom. Berman v. Parker, 348 US. 26 (1954).
1985] 1281
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one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelop-
ment of the area. Appellants argue that this makes the project a tak-
ing from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman.
But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress
alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established.
32
Thus, the Berman Court not only gave an almost unlimited
meaning to public use, it also drew a very limited role for
courts reviewing whether such actions were taken in the public
welfare.
In Midkiff, the Court unanimously confirmed the Berman
rationale.33 Midkiff involved a challenge to the Hawaii Land
Reform Act of 1967,3 which allowed Hawaii to condemn large
parcels of land owned by a few corporations, trusts, and
wealthy individuals and to transfer smaller parcels to individu-
als then leasing the parcels as homesites.35 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held the Act unconstitutional as a
"naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the
private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private
use and benefit. ' 36 The court of appeals noted that, under the
Act, lessees retained possession of the condemned property
during the eminent domain proceedings, with title passing di-
rectly to the lessees on completion of the proceedings. 37 The
court found that Berman was therefore distinguishable, because
the land in Berman was first transferred to the government for
a "public use" and only then transferred to private parties.38
The Supreme Court, however, found Berman controlling.3"
The Court unanimously held that the "'public use' require-
32. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33. 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
34. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 516-1 to § 516-186 (1976 & 1984 Supp.).
35. See 104 S. Ct. at 2325-26. The Act was a response to a study showing
that 47% of Hawaii's land was held by 72 property owners and 49% was held
by the state and federal governments. Id. at 2325. Much of the privately held
land was concentrated in less than two dozen hands. Id. The Hawaii legisla-
ture concluded that "concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing
the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring
the public tranquility and welfare." Id. The Act allows tenants of these land-
owners living on single-family residential lots to request that the state con-
demn the land on which they live if the land is within a developmental tract of
at least five acres. Id The State is then authorized to acquire the property if
the acquisition will "'effectuate the public purposes' of the Act." Id. (quoting
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-22 (1979)).
36. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2321
(1984).
37. Id at 797.
38. Id
39. 104 S. Ct. at 2328-29.
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ment is... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers" 40 and that "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
Clause."4- The Court also emphasized that courts must defer to
legislative determinations that the eminent domain action is a
public use unless the determination "'is shown to involve an
impossibility.' "42 Moreover, the legislatively determined public
use need not be successful as long as the legislature "rationally
could have believed" that eminent domain action would serve a
public end.43 Such judicial deference to state and federal legis-
latures is required, stated the Court, "because in our system of
government, legislatures are better able to assess what public
purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking
power." 4 The Court found that land reform is a valid public
purpose45 and hence a legitimate exercise of police power. It
further concluded that adopting eminent domain is not an irra-
tional means of achieving such reform.46 Because the Act also
satisfied the "weighty demand" of just compensation, the Court
held that the Act was constitutional under the fifth
amendment.47
Midkiff eliminates the judicial power to enforce the fifth
amendment's "public use" check.48 Courts may no longer inde-
pendently inquire into the purpose behind eminent domain ac-
40. Id at 2329.
41. Id- at 2331.
42. Id. at 2329 (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66
(1925)).
43. Id. at 2330 (quoting Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 451 U.S. 648, 671-672 (1981)) (emphasis in Western).
44. 104 S. Ct. at 2331. The court of appeals had indicated that this high
level of deference was to be accorded only to the United States Congress, and
not to state legislatures. 702 F.2d at 798. The Supreme Court rejected this dis-
tinction, stating that "[s]tate legislatures are as capable as Congress of making
such determinations within their respective spheres of authority." 104 S. Ct. at
2331. Thus, the Court continued, "if a legislature, state or federal, determines
there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must
defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use." Id.
45. 104 S. Ct. at 2330.
46. Id
47. Id at 2332.
48. State courts, of course, can still interpret their state constitutional pro-
visions to require what Professor Ross terms the "second-guess" mode of re-
view. See Ross, supra note 15, at 362-63. Few courts, however, appeared
willing to take this independent path in cases arising before Midk(ff. In
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d
455 (1981), the Michigan Supreme Court found that Detroit's acquisition and
demolition of an entire neighborhood was for a public use under the Michigan
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tions but must accept, on face value, legislative determinations
that the actions are for a public use. After Midkiff, the only
judicial checks remaining are just compensation and the eco-
nomic limitations that necessarily flow from such a
requirement.
II. JUST COMPENSATION AND DUNCANVILLE
Just as the term "public use" is open to wide variation in
interpretation, 49 "just compensation" could include many dif-
ferent levels of payment to the owner of property taken by em-
inent domain. At one extreme, the government would pay a
"fire-sale" price for the property but would not compensate the
Constitution, even though the land taken was to be transferred to General Mo-
tors (GM). Id at 632, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
The Poletown taking resulted from GM's expressed intention to close two
Detroit plants and construct a new plant in an area that would not need to be
cleared and that could accommodate new transportation facilities without sig-
nificant change in those already present. Id at 649, 304 N.W.2d at 466 (Ryan,
J., dissenting). No existing site in Detroit met GM's specific criteria for such a
"green fields" location. Detroit suggested nine areas that could meet the crite-
ria if acquired under the state's eminent domain power and cleared. Id. at 652,
304 N.W.2d at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting). GM chose the Poletown site, which
included a closed automobile factory and a residential neighborhood. Id. at
658-59, 304 N.W.2d at 470-71 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Detroit then assembled the
necessary land through private negotiation and eminent domain actions. Id. at
652-53, 304 N.W.2d at 467-68 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Poletown residents sought to enjoin the taking. The trial court denied re-
lief and, only ten days after oral arguments, the Michigan Supreme Court af-
firmed. Id at 659-60, 304 N.W.2d at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The court
stated that deference must be given to Detroit's decision that the Poletown
taking would be in the public use:
The Legislature has determined that governmental action of the
type contemplated here meets a public need and serves an essential
public purpose. The Court's role after such a determination is made is
limited....
The Legislature has delegated the authority to determine
whether a particular project constitutes a public purpose to the gov-
erning body of the municipality involved. The plaintiffs concede that
this project is the type contemplated by the Legislature and that the
procedures set forth in the Economic Development Corporations Act
have been followed. This further limits our review.
Id at 632-33, 304 N.W.2d at 458-59 (footnotes omitted). The court went on to
find that the Poletown taking was for a legitimate public objective, "even
though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit as an incident
thereto." Id at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 458. The court thus followed the logic of
Berman, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes 29-32, and fore-
shadowed the Supreme Court's reasoning three years later in Midkff. But see
supra note 27 (cases finding higher standard of "public use" under state
constitutions).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28; Ross, supra note 15, at 361-
1284 [Vol. 69:1277
]EMINENT DOMAIN1
owner for any additional costs resulting from the taking. At
the other extreme, the government would pay whatever value
the owner placed on the property,e plus all costs the owner in-
curred because of the taking.51 Current law falls somewhere
between the two extremes, but clearly leans toward minimal
payment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that just compen-
sation is the market value of the property, or the amount that a
willing buyer would pay a willing owner for the property.m
Two 1973 Supreme Court decisions illustrate both the standard
and shortcomings of market value as just compensation. In Al-
mota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States,M the
government instituted an eminent domain action to acquire
both the remaining term on a lessee's land lease and improve-
ments constructed by the lessee.- The lessee had rented the
land continuously from 1919 and had constructed and was pres-
ently operating grain elevator facilities on the leased land.-
During this period, the owner of the land had successively re-
newed the land lease, even though the lease did not contain an
option to renew.5 In 1967, when the government began the
condemnation proceedings, the lease term remaining was seven
and one-half years.57 The lessee argued that just compensation
for its property interest was the amount a willing buyer would
pay for the lease with the improvements in place and with the
clear expectation that the ground lease would be renewedms
50. Self-valuation by the owner would, of course, be impractical, because
the owner would likely engage in strategic bargaining and refuse to reveal the
actual value placed on the land. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441
U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
51. These costs could include items such as the cost of replacing the prop-
erty taken, loss of business revenue, and specific demoralization costs. See in-
fia text accompanying notes 167-182.
52. See eg., Duncanville, 105 S. CL 451, 455 (1984); United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1979); Almota Farmers Elevator & Ware-
house Co. v. U.S., 409 U.S. 470, 473 (1973); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,
374 (1943).
53. 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
54. Id. at 471. The government also brought an eminent domain action
against the underlying fee, id at 486 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), but had not
acquired title or possession of the property at the time it condemned the
lessee's property interest, or even at the time of the Supreme Court appeal, id.
at 477 n.4.
55. See id. at 470-71.
56. Id. at 471. The lease was renewed for periods of 20 years. See id. at
481.
57. Id. at 471.
58. I& at 471-72.
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The government contended that just compensation was the
amount a willing buyer would pay for the remaining seven and
one-half years of the lease term and the salvage value of the
improvements at the end of that term.59 In a five to four deci-
sion,60 the Court agreed with the lessee.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, identified just
compensation as the "full monetary equivalent of the property
taken;' 6 1 in other words, market value is measured by "'what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.'"62 The
Court rejected the government's contention that the lease re-
newal was speculative63 and determined that the lessee's inter-
est must be measured as of the day the eminent domain
proceedings began. 64 It was therefore irrelevant that the gov-
ernment had since contracted to buy the land underlying the
lease and could simply have refused to renew the lease on its
expiration.6 5 Consequently, the market value of the lessee's
property interest included a willing buyer's expectation that
the grain elevator facilities would remain in place beyond the
lease term:
In a free market, [the lessee] would hardly have sold the leasehold to
a purchaser who paid only for the use of the facilities over the re-
mainder of the lease term with [the lessee] retaining the right there-
after to remove the facilities-in effect, the right of salvage.66
For the Almota Court, just compensation was thus the amount
the lessee would have received if a "For Sale" sign had been
placed in front of the grain elevator and a buyer had
materialized.
In United States v. Fuller,67 decided on the same day as Al-
mota, the government brought an eminent domain action
against 920 of 1280 acres of ranch land owned in fee.68 The
property owner also held federal grazing permits under the
Taylor Grazing Act 69 to 31,461 acres adjacent to the fee land.70
59. Id
60. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Powell, and Stewart were in the
majority, with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
White in dissent. Id. at 470.
61. Id at 473.
62. Id at 474 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
63. See id. at 475.
64. See id at 477-78.
65. Id Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissenters, agreed with the gov-
ernment's contention. See id. at 486 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 475.
67. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
68. Id- at 488-49.
69. 43 U.S.C. § 315-315r (1982).
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The property owner contended that just compensation for the
property taken included the expectancy value of using the con-
demned land in conjunction with the Taylor Grazing Act
lands.7 The government argued that the possible availability
of the permits could not be considered as an element of value
because the permits were expressly revocable at the will of the
federal government.7 2 A five-justice majority, 3 different from
that in Almota, found for the government.
Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion, reiter-
ated that the property owner is entitled to fair market value 4
but declined to compensate the Fuller property owner for the
value a willing buyer would have placed on the fee land's prox-
imity to the Taylor Grazing Act land. Because the "constitu-
tional requirement of just compensation derives as much
content from the basic equitable principles of fairness... as it
does from technical concepts of property law,"75 the Court
found that the government need not compensate for "elements
of value" that it "has created, or that it might have destroyed
under the exercise of governmental authority other than the
power of eminent domain." 76 Thus, the government was not
required to compensate for the proximity value of Taylor Graz-
ing Act land because that value .was derived from permits that
the government had issued and could revoke at will.7
70. 409 U.S. at 489. The owner also leased 12,027 acres from the state of
Arizona. Id-
71. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 489.
72. I&
73. The majority consisted of the four members of the Almota dissent and
Justice Stewart, author of the Almota majority opinion. The other four mem-
bers of the Almota majority comprised the dissent in Fuller. See i&i at 488.
74. See id at 490.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Id- at 492.
77. Id at 493. This apparently distinguished the Fuller facts from those in
Almota for Justice Stewart. In Almota, the lessee's property interest in the
land was created by the property owner and the lessee had constructed the
grain elevator facilities. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. Moreover,
the government had no ability to "destroy" the lessee's interest in Almota
other than by condemning the underlying fee or the lessee's property interest.
See supra text accompanying note 65.
Justice Powell, writing for the four dissenting justices, rejected these tech-
nical distinctions, stating that the condemned land derived its value from its
proximity to land that, due to its location, was the logical beneficiary of the
Taylor Grazing Act, and not from the revocable permits themselves. Id. at 503
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also stressed the inequity of placing
the costs of an eminent domain action on the property owner.
It hardly serves the principles of fairness as they have been under-
stood in the law of just compensation to disregard what respondents
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The Almota and Fuller decisions reveal that the Court does
not attempt to determine the actual amount of costs that the
property owner incurred from the taking but limits its review
to the meaning of "market value." Market value, however,
does not include additional costs, such as loss of business reve-
nues, resulting from an eminent domain action.78 Rather, it is
the practical minimum that the Court could have chosen as
constituting "just compensation." Any less than some notion of
market value would have contradicted any logical meaning of
the words "just compensation." Moreover, market value may
sometimes be very different than the actual worth of a prop-
erty interest to a willing buyer. Under the Court's definition,
market value is merely a contrived concept based on a hypo-
thetical buyer and a hypothetical seller who enter into a hypo-
thetical purchase agreement. 79 The "uncertainty and
complexity"80 of this concept is exacerbated by the Court's abil-
ity to manipulate market value in an effort to comport with
"the basic equitable principles of fairness."81 The Court's inter-
pretation of just compensation is thus a mechanical and legalis-
tic definition that can severely understate the costs of eminent
domain. The practical result is that the government will under-
take eminent domain in some situations where the benefits to
the public do not exceed the costs of the taking.
Duncanville82 provides an illuminating example of the
potential for the inefficient use of eminent domain when the
government need only pay market value. As part of a flood
control project, the federal government condemned fifty acres
of land that Duncanville, Texas, used as a "sanitary landfill. '8 3
After the eminent domain proceedings began, Duncanville re-
placed the condemned dump with a superior facility encom-
passing over a hundred acres of land.8 Duncanville claimed
could have obtained for their land on the open market in favor of its
value artificially denuded of its surroundings.
Id at 504 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
79. The owner's and government's counsels can summon a gaggle of ex-
pert witnesses to offer testimony on market value, but unless the owner and a
buyer could willingly agree on a price, without considering the prospect of the
use of eminent domain, the experts can only speculate on market value and
will never be able to establish it as a fact.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
81. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 490.
82. 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984).
83. Id. at 453.
84. Id
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that just compensation for the taking was over $1.2 mllon, the
cost of replacing the condemned dump.s5 The government con-
tended that just compensation was limited to the market value
of the condemned dump, which it asserted was approximately
$200,000.86
1 At trial, the district court permitted both parties to pro-
duce evidence of the fair market value of the condemned dump
and the reasonable cost of a substitute facilityYs 7 On specific in-
terrogatories, the jury found that the fair market value of the
condemned dump was $225,000, and the reasonable cost of a
substitute facility was over $700,000.88 The district court, how-
ever, determined that no special basis existed for departing
from the traditional market value standard89 and found that to
require the government to replace the condemned dump would
necessarily provide Duncanville with a "windfall."' 9  The court
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Duncanville, 529 F. Supp. 220, 222 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 706 F.2d
1356 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. CL 451 (1984). The court concluded that the
market value standard could be deviated from only when the market value
could not be ascertained or provided inadquate compensation for the taking.
See id. The jury had determined the market value of the condemned dump,
and, according to the court, that market value amply compensated Dun-
canville for the taking. See id. at 222-23.
90. Id. at 222. The district court relied heavily on United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979) (Lutheran Synod), for the conclusion that
awards for the costs of substitute facilities are "windfalls." In Lutheran
Synod, the government condemned three nonprofit summer camps operated
by Lutheran Synod. Lutheran Synod claimed that just compensation was the
cost of developing functionally equivalent substitute facilities at a new site, ap-
proximately $5.8 million. Id. at 508. The government offered only the market
value of the property, $485,400. Id. The Supreme Court conceded that market
value might not be sufficient to permit Lutheran Synod to continue operation
of its summer camps at a new location. See id. at 514. Lutheran Synod's
unique need for the property, however, was a "nontransferable value" and not
compensable under the fifth amendment. Id. The Court further stressed that
Lutheran Synod was under no factual or legal obligation to replace the camps
and could therefore receive a "windfall" under the substitute-facilities mea-
sure. See id. at 515-16. Concurring, Justice White expanded the "windfall"
theory.
Obviously, replacing the old with a new facility will cost more than
the value of the old, but the new facility itself will be more valuable
and last longer ... Similarly, if more demanding building codes or
other regulations will enhance the cost of replacement, it is reason-
able to assume that compliance itself will be of some benefit to the
owner and hence need not be financed by the condemnor.
Id. at 518 (White, J., concurring). Although Lutheran Synod foreclosed substi-
tute-facilities compensation for private condemnees, it left open the possibility
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therefore entered judgement for the city for $225,000, the mar-
ket value of the condemned dump.91 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, reasoning that Duncanville as a city was required to
replace the dump92 and that to "deny Duncanville reimburse-
ment for its unavoidable loss would be to deny just compensa-
tion."93 Consequently, Duncanville was entitled to the amount
needed to replace the condemned dump with a "functionally
equivalent substitute facility." Any potential windfall to Dun-
canville from this valuation measure could be avoided by dis-
counting the award by the degree to which the new installation
was superior to the one being replaced. 94
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court sweepingly
rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach and reaffirmed that just
compensation is presumptively market value.95 The Court
noted that the substitute facility measure created the risk that
awards would be given for facilities that were never built or
that were later converted to a different use.96 The Court stated
that a superiority discount would not avoid this risk but would
instead add uncertainty and complexity to the jury's valuation
process, thereby increasing the possibility of errors and "wind-
falls." 97 The implementation of the circuit court's approach,
the Court commented, would require the fact finder to make at
least two complicated determinations:
i) the reasonable (rather than the actual) replacement cost, which
would require an inquiry into the fair market value of the second fa-
that public condemnees, required to replace the condemned facilities, could re-
ceive such compensation. See id at 509 n.3. The district court in Duncanville,
however, did not find the distinction between private and public property own-
ers persuasive. 529 F. Supp. at 222-23.
91. See 529 F. Supp. at 220-21.
92. See Duncanville, 706 F.2d 1356, 1360 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
451 (1984).
93. Id-
94. Id at 1362-63. The court held that the district court's jury instructions
on the substitute-facilities measure was "inadequate to enable the jury to
make a fair and complete determination of the costs," and therefore remanded
for a new trial. Id at 1363.
95. See 105 S.Ct. at 455. The Court found only two exceptions to the mar-
ket value rule: deviations upward are allowed when market value is too diffi-
cult to ascertain or when market value would be so minimal in comparison to
the actual costs as to be manifestly unjust. See id. The Court quickly found
the first exception inapplicable because both the Government and Duncanville
admitted the existence of "a fairly robust market" for landfill properties. Id.
In the remainder of the opinion, the Court explained why the market value
was not manifestly unjust compensation for the taking of Duncanville's dump.
96. See id. at 457.
97. See id at 457.
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cility, and (ii) the extent to which the new facility is superior to the
old, which would require an analysis of the qualitative differences be-
tween the new and the old.98
The end result of this process, even if undertaken correctly,
"may amount to nothing more than a round-about method of
arriving at the market value of the condemned facility."9
The Supreme Court further found that just compensation
requires an objective standard of valuation and should not in-
clude any elements of the property's subjective value to the
owner.1 00 To emphasize the necessity for purely objective stan-
dards, the Court quoted at length from its 1949 eminent domain
opinion in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States:10
Most things .. . have a general demand which gives them a value
transferable from one owner to another. As opposed to such personal
and variant standards as value to the particular owner whose property
has been taken, this transferable value has an external validity which
makes it a fair measure of public obligation to compensate the loss in-
curred by an owner as a result of the taking of his property for public
use. In view, however, of the liability of all property to condemnation
for the common good, loss to the owner of nontransferable values de-
riving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment
to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly
treated as part of the burden of common citizenship.'
02
The Fifth Circuit's substitute facility measure of just compensa-
tion was therefore improper because it compensated for the
condemnee's need to have a replacement facility, in other
words, it compensated for a "nontransferable value." 0 3
Although intended as an indictment of the substitute-cost
measure of valuation, Duncanville's holding that market value
is the proper measure of just compensation actually tends to be
undercut by the Court's reasoning that market value is the
most simple and certain measure. The process of determining
market value contains uncertainties and complexities similar to
those in determining the comparative value and superiority of a
substitute facility. Under the market value standard, the fact
finder establishes the amount that a willing buyer would pay
for the property taken by considering amounts paid for compa-
98. Id- at 458.
99. IC
100. See id
IOL 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
102. 105 S. Ct. at 458 (quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1, 5 (1949)).
103. 105 S. Ct. at 458.
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rable properties.10 4 The process of comparing values and quali-
ties is thus very similar under the substitute facility and
market value standards of just compensation. Moreover, expert
testimony on the comparative value of a substitute facility is
unlikely to be more difficult for a fact finder to comprehend
than testimony on the value of the condemned facility. In Dun-
canville, expert testimony on the value of the condemned
dump ranged from $160,410 to $370,000.105 From this testimony,
the jury found that the market value of the dump was
$225,000.106
The Court's strict bar against subjective values entering
into the just compensation award also appears unsupported.
The Court found that market value, as a "transferable value,"
has an "'external validity'" that makes it a "'fair measure of
the public obligation to compensate the loss incurred by an
owner as a result of the taking of [the] property.' "107 The
Court, however, offered no reason why "transferable value" has
any greater "external validity" than does "nontransferable
value." If the Court was relying on the ease of translating mar-
ket value into monetary terms, market value has no signifi-
cantly greater "external validity" than does the cost of a
functionally equivalent substitute facility or any other element
of damages that can be given a monetary value. On the con-
trary, the cost of the substitute facility in Duncanville was
known; the only speculation was over the degree to which it
was a superior facility. The Court's reasoning therefore is re-
duced to the assertion that it is simply "fair" for the owner to
bear the burden of losing "nontransferable values" as part of
the "burden of common citizenship."
The only justification for Duncanville is its adherence to
the rules of prior cases, and stare decisis is hardly a compelling
reason to restate bad law. Duncanville does not attempt to ne-
gate the possibility that in some situations, market value will
not cover all the costs that a property owner incurs from a tak-
ing.108 Instead, the Duncanville Court focuses its attention on
104. United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 486 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1972);
see 4 P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 12.311[3] (collecting cases).
105. 105 S. Ct. at 453 n.5.
106. Id at 454.
107. Id at 458 (quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5
(1949)).
108. Indeed, the Court admits that market value is a minimum standard
and that Congress, if it desires, can authorize greater compensation. See 105 S.
Ct. at 455 n.14. Because the Court concedes that Congress, and by implication
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avoiding the risk that a property owner will receive more than
its costs, or a "windfall." The end result is that the Court has
adopted a measure of "just compensation" that cannot be all
things to all property holders. By setting a formalistic standard
for all condemnations, the Court neglects to construct a stan-
dard that more closely approximates the costs resulting in indi-
vidual cases and that would thus tend to create a more efficient
and equitable approach to eminent domain.
III. POLITICAL LIMITS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
The Court in Midkiff must have relied on its faith in the
representative system to conclude that courts should not "sec-
ond-guess" a government's determination of existence of a pub-
lic use "'unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation.' "109 To a lesser extent, the Court's decision in
Duncanville is also built on the belief that the political process
provides a check on governmental exercises of eminent domain
Although the Duncanville Court found that courts can deviate
upward from the market value formula only "'when market
value [is] too difficult to find, or when its application would re-
sult in manifest injustice to owner or public,' ",.o it also as-
serted that governments may deviate upward whenever they
conclude it best to do so.-' Thus the Court in Duncanville, as
it did in Midkiff, placed the burden of limiting governmental
actions on the government itself. The balance has therefore
shifted from the judicial enclave to the political arena.
Governmental decisions to use eminent domain are made
by legislators and executives who are accountable to their con-
stituents. In theory, when a majority of voters disagrees with
its representatives' use of eminent domain, the voters will re-
spond by electing new representatives. The political system,
therefore, should itself provide the necessary check on the use
of eminent domain. This theory presumes, however, that the
American society consists of an informed,"2 politically ac-
state and local governments, can pay greater compensation, it follows that
such greater payment serves a public purpose by being no more than compen-
satory, and hence just.
109. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec.
RR Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
110. 105 S. Ct. at 455 (quoting United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,
339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)).
111. 105 S. Ct. at 455 n.14, 457.
112. It is unlikely that any person has access to perfect information and
much less likely that the person has that perfect information. An "informed"
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tive,113 and unprejudiced 14 electorate, that the electorate
selects informed legislators and executives who in turn make
accurate,115 uncorrupted, 118 and reasoned 117 decisions, and that
the electorate engages in effective review of actions 18 taken by
citizen, therefore, is one who has good information. While this is admittedly
vague, "good" encompasses enough information to know the basic claims being
made by the proponents of the different sides of an issue and to enable a per-
son to form a reasoned opinion about which side should prevail.
113. A "politically active" electorate is one that becomes informed and ex-
presses its preferences by voting. Although this does not necessitate unani-
mous participation, it should include proportionate participation by ethnic and
socioeconomic groups.
114. The electorate should not be prejudiced for or against any group or
person. An unprejudiced electorate will weigh the concerns of the various
parties in a dispute and base its decision on the merits of the dispute rather
than its opinion of the parties to the dispute.
115. An accurate decision is not merely an informed, reasoned, and uncor-
rupted decision. It is also a correct decision, a decision not based on a mistake
or illusion.
116. An uncorrupted decision is a decision not motivated by the personal
gain of the decision maker.
117. To be reasoned, the decision must be both efficient, such that its ag-
gregate benefits outweigh its aggregate costs, and fair. "Fairness" in this con-
text encompasses both fairness in fact and fairness in perception. Durham, In
Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Mortgage
Foreclosure, 36 S.C. L. REV. 461, 503-04 (1985). Fairness in fact is tied to effi-
ciency and equity, with equity being the formulation of society's choices for
the distribution of resources and benefits. In this Article, the terms "effi-
ciency" and "equity" will be used to distinguish between fairness in fact and
fairness in perception. Fairness in perception goes to procedural fairness-the
fairness of the process by which the decision is adopted and carried out-and
the fairness of the overall result.
A higher burden is placed on elected officials, who are required to be rea-
sonable, than on the electorate, which is merely required to be unprejudiced.
Elected officials should have the information and expertise to make the cor-
rect decision, one that is efficient, equitable, and fair. See A. DowNs, AN
ECONONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 27 (1957). The electorate, on the other
hand, will not always be able to get the same information as the elected offi-
cials and will not have the same expertise. The electorate, therefore, cannot
always be expected to make the right decision but can be required to make an
unprejudiced decision.
The electorate also is not required, as elected officials are, to be uncor-
rupted. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. This reflects the belief
that it is difficult to "buy off" the electorate, but it is at least a possiblity that
some elected officials will be influenced by personal gain. To the extent that
the electorate could be corrupted, the corruption will be manifested in preju-
dice by the electorate. Although corruption in elected officials might be simi-
larly addressed by the fairness in perception requirement, the possiblity of
corruption is sufficiently large to address it as a separate component in the
theory of a political check on eminent domain.
118. This is the most important assumption underlying the Midkiff and
Duncanville decisions. If courts stand as obstacles to the use of eminent do-
main, the real damage can be stopped when necessary. If the courts block the
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its elected representatives.
' The premise that the actors in the political process-the
electorate and its legislators and executives-are adequately in-
formed' 9 as to the costs and benefits of the eminent domain ac-
tion is key to the validity of most of the theory's other
assumptions. If this assumption does not withstand analysis,
each of the other assumptions also must fall. An electorate
with inadequate information cannot always be assumed to be
politically active and fair or to effectively review the eminent
domain decisions of its legislators and executives. Nor can the
most reasonable and uncorrupted of representatives make accu-
rate decisions based on inadequate and thus inaccurate data.
The likelihood that the public educates itself with all the facts
and figures behind eminent domain actions, however, is
slight. 20 Moreover, the incentive of representatives to gather
the necessary information to make the right decision is most
likely less than the incentive to make a decision that could aid
in their bids for reelection.' 2 ' The mere possibility that these
factors will result in some eminent domain actions based on in-
adequate information gives rise to the need for some other
check.
Even if the decisions of the electorate and the elected are
based on adequate information, however, the validity of the
eminent domain actions, there will be no forced sales and the status quo will
be preserved. If the electorate then chooses to turn the offending officials out
of office because the electorate decides that the officials have not acted in its
interests, so much the better. On the other hand, if the courts do not stand as
an obstacle to the use of eminent domain, it is essential that the electorate not
only be informed, politically active, and unprejudiced, but that it focus on
those who made the decision to use'eminent domain and turn them out of of-
fice if the use was inappropriate. Without that direct attack by the electorate,
there will be no political check.
119. "Adequate" information requires both sufficient and correct
information.
120. See A. DowNS, supr note 17, at 80. Anthony Downs suggests, "fun
many cases, most citizens do not know what they want government to do." Id.
at 90. Downs also states that the no one "has a very high incentive to acquire
political information" because information is "relatively useless" to those who
care .who wins and because those for whom information is useful do not care
who wins. See id, at 244. He notes that "[a]ny concept of democracy based on
an electorate of equally well-informed citizens is irrational" because of the va-
riable costs and incentives to acquiring information. See id. at 236. Finally,
Downs concludes that people vote even if they are not informed. See id. at
298.
12L- Id- at 30-31 (the officials' greatest incentive is reelection, and their de-
cisions will reflect the position that will receive "the most votes without violat-
ing constitutional rules").
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political check theory is still doubtful in light of the low level
of participation by those eligible to vote. It is difficult to argue
that the electorate is politically active and engages in effective
review of actions taken by its representatives when only a
small majority of those eligible vote.122 Moreover, the level of
voter participation is not proportionate socially, economically,
or racially,m casting serious doubts on the assumption that the
electorate as a whole is unprejudiced. As Anthony Downs has
suggested, every individual is selfish 124 and seeks to maximize
personal utility,1t which may or may not include altruism.12
A majority of the voting electorate may decide that the emi-
nent domain action benefits them and therefore support the ac-
tion despite the inequitable burdening of the minority.12 7
When a disproportionate group of people from a high socioeco-
nomic status dominates the polls, for example, the result may
not be the one most fair but the one most favorable to people of
that status.
The assumption that elected officials constantly engage in
both reasoned and uncorrupted decision making128 also does
122. See generally H. BONE & A. RANNEY, POLIMS AND VOTERS 32-46 (4th
ed. 1976). Between 55% and 65% of eligible voters voted in United States pres-
idential elections from 1948-1972. Id- at 35. Voter turnout for national elec-
tions has been declining since 1960. Id at 34. Moreover, voter turnout Is even
lower for local elections: "Turnout is almost always higher in national elec-
tions than in state and local elections." Id& Because most eminent domain ac-
tions are local, this further exacerbates the effect of low voter turnout on
eminent domain issues.
123. Professors Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney note:
[]en vote proportionately more than women, older people more than
younger, more educated people more than less educated, people with
high socioeconomic status more than people with low status, Catholics
and Jews more than Protestants, and whites more than blacks.
Id at 35. Downs states that the wealthy are better educated and better able to
acquire information, see A. DOWNS, supra note 117, at 235, and concludes that
these factors may explain why the wealthy are more politically active than the
poor, see ic. at 299. Downs also suggests that low voter turnout and the voter's
lack of adequate information may be interrelated:
No matter how significant a difference between parties is revealed to
the rational citizen by his free information, or how uncertain he is
about which party to support, he realizes that his vote has almost no
chance of influencing the outcome. Therefore why should he buy
political information? . . . He will not even utilize all the free infor-
mation available, since assimilating it takes time.
Id. at 245.
124. See A. DOWNS, supra note 117, at 27.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 27.
127. I&
128. See supra notes 116-17.
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not reflect reality. The political livelihood of these officials de-
pends on satisfying their constituents. Even when fully in-
formed as to the consequences of an eminent domain action,
therefore, legislators and executives will not always reach the
rational decision but may reach a decision that best furthers
their self-interests. 9 In addition, government officials some-
times make mistakes.130 A very probable mistake that some of-
ficials might make in eminent domain decisions will be to
operate under a "fiscal illusion." The concept of fiscal illusion
proposes that governmental bodies underestimate costs unless
required to include them in their budgets.' 3 ' Fiscal illusion will
be a significant factor in the accuracy of eminent domain deci-
sions as long as current law permits governments to externalize
many costs of eminent domain by requiring only minimal just
compensation.
New York City's construction of the Cross-Bronx Express-
way in the 1950's exemplifies the inadequacies of the political
process as a check on the use of eminent domain.l sm The Cross-
Bronx Expressway was one of several major traffic arteries
that Robert Moses, a New York City Planning Commissioner
and Construction Coordinator,lss built after World War 1I s 4 in
129. Downs comments:
Favor-buying is usually nothing so crude as bribery;, it is the subtler
device of making campaign contributions in return for a favorable dis-
position of attitudes by a party: pro-free-enterprise, pro-labor, anti-
free-trade, etc. The payments received by the party may not even be
in money. Instead they may be editorial policies, weight thrown in a
crucial electoral district, or willingness to refrain from opposing cer-
tain policies.
A. DOWN, supra note 317, at 92.
130. See S. MAlTAL, MINDS, MARKErs, & MoNEY 268-69 (1982) (noting that
any new behavioral economics theory must acknowledge that human beings
err). Professor Schlomo Maital explains that people err in the way they per-
ceive reality and that this misperception of government and other people's be-
havior determines conduct.
131 Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analy-
sis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 620 (1984); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE I.J. 385, 420 (1977).
132. This discussion of the Cross-Bronx Expressway is drawn from Robert
Caro's biography of Robert Moses. See Rt. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 850-94
(1974).
133. Id. at 3. Although Moses served as Park Commissioner, New York
City Construction Coordinator, and Planning Commissioner, he held an in-
credible amount of power to shape the city of New York. In four decades, he
built most of the major expressways and parks, he supervised construction of
nearly $27 billion of public works, and he originated and promoted major ur-
ban renewal projects throughout New York City. Id. at 3-16.
134. Although not an engineer, Moses supervised the building of 627 miles
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an attempt to alleviate New York City's crushing traffic
problems.135 Although the Cross-Bronx Expressway is only
seven miles long,1 36 Moses's biographer, Robert Caro, chose to
describe the process of selecting a mere mile of the express-
way's route in his story of political power and political
powerlessness.
That one mile section of the Cross-Bronx Expressway runs
through the Bronx's East Tremont neighborhood. East
Tremont was a crowded neighborhood137 composed primarily of
Jews whose parents had escaped from the poverty of New York
City's Lower East Side 1 38 and who could not themselves afford
to escape the crowding of East Tremont.139 Despite the draw-
backs of East Tremont, it was still a neighborhood to which its
residents were fiercely loyal.140
This mile of the Cross-Bronx Expressway fell at a point re-
quiring a slight curve that could have followed one of two
routes. The first route would have taken the expressway along
the border of Crotona Park, a right-of-way already owned by
New York City, and would have required the acquisition of six
apartment buildings, housing a total of nineteen families, and
the Third Avenue Transit Company's bus terminal. 141 The sec-
ond route was longer and entailed a wider curve in the Ex-
pressway.' 42  In addition, the second route required the
acquisition and demolition of fifty-four apartment buildings,
ninety buildings housing one or two families, and sixty stores,
displacing a total of 1530 families.' 43 The land acquisition costs
were $10 million higher for the second route, and no estimate
of roads in and around New York City, id at 850, and Moses personally se-
lected the route for the Cross-Bronx Expressway. Id. at 878.
135. Id. at 850.
136. I&
137. The neighborhood housed 441 persons per residential acre, which "was
considered 'undesirable' by social scientists." Id at 851.
138. Id
139. East Tremont consisted of older buildings. Id. It was also a neighbor-
hood in an area in transition from being primarily white to becoming primar-
ily black, id. at 857, which may have been viewed as a negative by the white,
Jewish residents of the area in the early 1950's.
140. Caro identifies several elements that account for the residents' loyalty.
Many of the residents had lived in East Tremont their entire lives. Id. at 853.
It was close to the garment district where many of the residents worked. Id at
851. Finally, rents were low enough to permit many residents to afford a de-
cent place away from the Lower East Side and for others to afford other in-
dicators of social mobility, such as sending their children to college. Id. at 855.
141. Id at 878.
142. See id. at 864 (map of two routes).
143. Id. at 869.
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was made of the additional costs of relocation and loss of future
property tax revenues.144 The residents of East Tremont fa-
vored the first route. Moses favored the second.
Caro recounts in great detail the fight mounted by the East
Tremont residents to persuade Moses to accept the first route
and to influence the politicians who would vote on which route
to adopt.14 5 The residents' campaign failed. More importantly,
those politicians voting for the second route suffered virtually
no political consequences from their choice, even though sev-
eral reneged on promises to help residents, publicly reversed
their positions, and voted for Moses's route.146
Why Robert Moses insisted on the second route and why
the elected officials supported his decision are impossible to de-
termine. Caro suggests several possible reasons for Moses's in-
sistence on the second route, including political corruption 147
and whim exacerbated by stubbornness.148 The legislators and
executives may have acquiesced to Moses because of corruption,
fear of Moses's political clout, inadequate information, or sim-
ple mistake. For whatever reason, no political repercussions
followed the politicians' votes. Robert Moses may have been an
extraordinarily powerful man, and New York may be an ex-
traordinarily large city, but 1530 families were directly affected
by an arbitrary use of eminent domain and the representative
system did not prevent it from happening. No political uprising
occurred,149 and very little was ever reported in the New York
papers for other citizens to read and consider.'-' The majority
of the voting electorate thus either did not know how the route
for this mile of the Cross-Bronx Expressway was chosen, did
not care how the route was chosen, or knew and cared but felt
144. Id.
145. Id- at 859-875.
146. Id-
147. Caro suggests that Moses may have chosen the first route because the
second would have required condemnation of property owned by a relative of
Bronx Borough President James Lyons. See id at 877. In addition, the Third
Avenue Bus Company, whose terminal was also slated to be condemned for
the first route, may have applied pressure or used influence to convince Moses
to adopt the second route.
148. See id. at 878.
149. The lack of public response may be partly attributed to the great
speed at which the eminent domain actions proceeded and were concluded.
Only ten months after the East Tremont buildings were taken by eminent do-
main the buildings were vacant Id. at 884. The 1530 families were rushed out
of their homes in 1954, id. at 881, for an expressway that was not completed
until 1960, id- at 886.
150. Id- at 869, 876-77.
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the route was in their best interests. The result was neither ef-
ficient nor equitable.
As demonstrated by the Cross-Bronx Expressway experi-
ence, some check on governmental decisions to use eminent do-
main actions is necessary, and the political system cannot
provide it. At one time, the "public use" requirement of the
fifth amendment may have provided a sufficient check by per-
mitting courts to inquire into the purpose, the quality, and the
advisability of the eminent domain action.151 Following
Midkiff,:5 2 however, the public use requirement will be no
greater a check than the political system.15 3 Only the "just
compensation" requirement retains enough vitality to allow
courts to check the inefficiencies and inequities of governmen-
tal eminent domain actions-inefficiencies and inequities
caused, to a large extent, by the present interpretation of just
compensation.
IV. EFFICIENT JUST COMPENSATION
If all eminent domain actions proposed by governments
were efficient and equitable, no need would exist for a judicial
check on such actions. The Cross-Bronx Expressway demon-
strates the fallacy of such a proposition. 15 A government may
pursue an inefficient eminent domain action because it under-
estimates the costs or overestimates the benefits of the taking.
Moreover, the decision to use eminent domain may be made by
corrupted or unfair officials, who are unconcerned about ineffi-
ciency even though aware of it. Finally, an eminent domain ac-
tion may be inequitable because the burden of the action falls
on a minority of the population.
Measuring just compensation by the market value of the
property taken greatly increases the probability that a govern-
ment's eminent domain action will be inefficient. Because the
government is not accountable for all the costs of the taking,155
151. See Ross, supra note 15, at 362 (describing the "second-guess" mode of
review that courts could apply when determining whether the eminent do-
main action meets the "public use" requirement).
152. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 22-48.
154. Efficient and equitable actions, of course, do not preclude actions re-
sulting from corruption and unfair procedures or motivations. These dangers,
however, are not endemic to eminent domain actions, and courts need no spe-
cial power to check these dangers.
155. The market value measure of just compensation can understate both
the dollar and social costs of the eminent domain actions. See ifra notes
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"fiscal illusion"'' z may cause underestimation of costs and fail
to deter if not induce inefficient actions. Further, the market
value standard allows inequity to taint even efficient eminent
domain actions. For example, the benefits of a taking may in-
deed outweigh its costs, but a substantial proportion of those
costs will be borne by the owners of the property being taken
by the eminent domain action.
Many of the causes of inefficient and inequitable eminent
domain actions could be eliminated by requiring governments
to compensate owners and the public for all external costs that
should enter into a government's cost/benefit calculus. The
governments would thus be forced to consider the efficiency of
proposed actions, and the burden of actions undertaken by the
governments would be borne by the same public that is sup-
posed to benefit from the action. Such "efficient just compen-
sation" would not, of course, prevent inefficient actions arising
from overestimation of an action's benefits or from corruption
and unfairness of decision makers. The potential that these
factors create for inefficient takings, however, indicates that
the individual property owners should not suffer the conse-
quences of these inefficiencies, but rather that the burden
should fall on the public that fails to prevent these inefficien-
cies through effective review of government decisions to em-
ploy eminent domain.157
A. DETERMINING THE COSTS IN AN EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
For efficient just compensation to be an effective check on
governmental uses of eminent domain, the costs to others, or
"externalities,"' 58 that should enter into a government's
cost/benefit analysis must be identified. Implicit in the notion
that efficiency can be determined by weighing an action's costs
against its benefits is the idea that both the costs and benefits
can be reduced to some uniform method of valuation. The most
intuitive method of valuation is to use monetary value, but not
all externalities of an eminent domain action can readily be
given monetary value. In such circumstances, as Judge Stephen
167-91 and accompanying text; Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Do-
main, 84 J. PoL. ECON. 473, 479 (1976) ('Fixing the price at market average
understates the social opportunity cost [of eminent domain].").
156. See supra text accompanying note 131.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 119-27.
158. Externalities, or spillovers, have been described as "(t]he differences
between true social costs and unregulated price." S. BREYER, supra note 14, at
23.
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Breyer has stated, the efficiency analysis should only recognize
those externalities that are "large, fairly concrete, and roughly
monetizeable."'' 5 9
To illustrate this method of determining the costs of an ac-
tion, consider a situation in which a coal-fired electrical gener-
ating plant equipped with the best pollution control devices
available is located in a residential neighborhood. To produce
one unit of electricity, the plant can burn either scarce, expen-
sive hard coal for $5 or plentiful, cheap soft coal for $4. With
no other factors entering the efficiency analysis, the plant
should burn soft coal because it costs less than burning hard
coal. Further assume, however, that the plant's pollution con-
trol devices prevent any smoke emissions when hard coal is
burned but permit a substantial amount of smoke to be emitted
from the plant when soft coal is burned. The smoke primarily
affects persons living in the adjacent residential neighborhood,
with only a negligible effect on the overall air quality of the
city in which the plant is located. The cost/benefit calculus
must now include those effects on other persons, or externali-
ties, that are "large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable."
The physical damage to surrounding residents 60 by the
smoke clearly should be regarded as one of the costs of burning
soft coal. It is large, concrete, and roughly, if not exactly,
monetizable.16 1 In contrast, the physical damage suffered by
the city's citizens is arguably concrete and monetizable,162 but is
not large because the smoke has only a negligible effect on the
city's air quality. Therefore, under Judge Breyer's assertion
159. I& at 26.
160. The damages suffered by both the residents of the surrounding area
and the city's citizens include any physical damage to or diminution in value of
their real and personal property, any costs of avoiding the effects of the
smoke, and any shortening or loss of life.
161. Physical damage to or diminution in value of real and personal prop-
erty may be difficult to ascertain, but both are monetizable. The same can be
said about the costs of avoiding the effects of the smoke. It will be more diffi-
cult both to ascertain and monetize any shortening or loss of life, but to the
degree that they can be ascertained and monetized they should be included.
162. The damages should be as readily monetizable as the physical damage
to surrounding residents. See supra note 161. In an absolute sense, the dam-
ages should also be just as concrete. See id The smoke only neglibly affects
the city's air quality, however, and the physical damage incurred by the city's
citizens may be so small as to defy easy detection. For example, the smoke
may noticeably and rapidly deteriorate the paint on an adjacent resident's
house but only slightly affect the paint on houses in other parts of the city.
The damage is concrete nonetheless, but finding the damage and linking the
damage to its cause is another matter.
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that only those externalities that are large should enter into an
efficiency analysis, the physical damage to the citizens is not in-
cluded as a cost of burning soft coal.
Another externality to be considered is the demoralization
costs suffered by the adjacent residents and the citizens of the
city. Professor Frank I. Michelman has defined "demoraliza-
tion costs" as
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which
accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realiza-
tion that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized
dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired in-
centives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated
losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the
thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment
on some other occasion
163
Demoralization costs can be divided into specific and general
demoralization costs.164 The adjacent property owners, for ex-
ample, suffer specific demoralization costs because they are di-
rectly affected by the smoke. The city's citizens are indirectly
affected by the small, immeasurable impact of the smoke when
combined with other air pollution, and thus suffer general de-
moralization costs.
In this hypothetical, both specific and general demoraliza-
tion costs may not be large, are not concrete, and are difficult
to monetize. Indeed, ascertaining the very existence of such
costs is a formidable task. As Professor Michelman noted:
[l]t obviously will not do to interview every potential compensation
claimant and ask him how demoralized he expects to be if a given
measure is adopted without provision for compensation.... The in-
terviewee probably will not himself know the answer to the question
(putting aside the difficulty of his attaching a dollar value to his out-
rage and his loss of incentive even if he could appraise those subjec-
tively) and, for strategic reasons, would not reveal the true answer if
he knew it.
We are compelled, then, to frame the question about demoraliza-
tion costs in terms of responses we must impute to ordinarily cogni-
zant and sensitive members of society.165
Consequently, the specific and general demoralization costs re-
sulting from a decision to burn soft coal do not meet the test
163. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethiaal
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967)
(footnote omitted). Although Professor Michelman's brilliant article dealt
with the problem of uncompensated takings resulting from governmental ac-
tions other than eminent domain, his definition of demoralization costs is
adaptable to the compensated takings resulting from eminent domain.
164. See Ross, supra note 15, at 377 nn.89-90.
165. See Michelman, supra note 163, at 1215-16.
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for externalities suggested by Judge Breyer and should not be
considered a cost of burning soft coal within a cost/benefit
analysis.
The only externality entering into the analysis, therefore,
is the physical damage to persons living in the surrounding resi-
dences. If the damage is less than the $1 per unit differential
between hard and soft coal, the plant should burn soft coal. On
the other hand, if the damage is more than the $1 per unit dif-
ference, the plant should use hard coal. 166 The coal chosen.will
be that which the cost/benefit analysis indicates will produce
the most efficient result.
B. DETERMINING THE COSTS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Just as efficiency was initially determined in the power
plant hypothetical by looking only at the internal cost of burn-
ing hard or soft coal and ignoring the costs incurred by others,
the current use of market value as just compensation in emi-
nent domain limits a determination of the efficiency of eminent
domain. As with the power plant, the efficiency of a taking is
166. This hypothetical has approached the efficiency analysis without re-
gard to who is making the decision whether to burn hard or soft coal. If the
plant is making the determination, it very likely will not include externalities
such as the physical damage to residents in its cost/benefit analysis unless it is
legally responsible for those costs. In most circumstances, however, legal enti-
tlement will not affect the actual efficiency of an action. Coase, The Problem
of Social Costs, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960). Thus, the plant's cost/benefit
calculus, reflecting only its legal obligations, does not reflect efficiency but the
plant's balance sheet.
Legal entitlement enters the efficiency analysis to the extent that a deci-
sion must be made as to where the entitlement should be assigned. Under the
Coase Theorem, the legal entitlement should be assigned to minimize transac-
tion costs, thereby reaching the efficient result for the situation. Id. Transac-
tion costs occur when affected parties deal with each other. For example, if
the plant is not legally liable for its pollution, and the surrounding residents
suffer aggregate damages of $2 for every unit produced from the soft coal, the
residents will be willing to pay the plant up to $2 per unit to burn hard coal.
Transaction costs will result from meeting with plant managers to set the pay-
ment terms and from any strategic bargaining, which occurs when one party
asserts an inefficient position to gain an advantage. For example, the plant
managers may insist on a $2 per unit payment even though their additional
cost of burning hard coal is only $1; if no agreement is reached as a result, the
strategic bargaining has, by itself, become a transaction cost.
If the transaction costs are higher when the plant is allowed to pollute
than when it is not, the plant should be forbidden to pollute. When the legal
entitlement is assigned, the resulting distribution of wealth does not figure in
the efficiency analysis. That the plant must now bear the additional cost of
burning hard coal and the citizens have gained the benefit of clean air does not
affect the decision to bar the plant from polluting.
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determined only when both internal and external costs and
benefits are considered. A government's cost/benefit calculus
of an eminent domain action, therefore, must include not only
the market value of the property taken but also all externali-
ties that are 'large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable."
The proposed efficient just compensation standard would force
the government to recognize these externalities in its efficiency
analysis by making them internal costs included in the govern-
ment's budget, and thus impossible to ignore.
1. Externalities of the Owners Whose Lands Are Taken
Five categories of external costs presently borne by own-
ers 67 whose lands are taken by eminent domain can be identi-
fied: replacement of the land and improvements taken;1'8
relocation, including moving costs, and the termination and
startup costs of utilities and other services; lost current busi-
ness revenue;169 lost business goodwill or value;170 and any spe-
cific demoralization costs. The first four categories of costs
should all enter into a government's cost/benefit analysis.171
Like market value in the current system of just compensation,
these costs are measured in monetary terms and are either di-
rectly provable by the owner or can be estimated by experts.
167. The following listing of an owner's costs includes costs that would be
incurred by both a residential owner and a business owner. Obviously, not
every owner will incur the same costs.
168. Compensation for these costs would only be appropriate to the extent
they exceeded the market value of the property taken. Compensation for
these additional costs would not be double recovery, but instead would put the
owner in the position that would have existed but for the eminent domain ac-
tion. Further, the owner does not owe the government any money if the
owner acquires replacement property for less than the market value of the
taken property. Every owner has the right to relocate for financial gain. The
government should not be able to deprive the owner of any potential gain by
forcing the relocation decision.
169. Such costs can result from a business being forced to temporarily
cease operation during physical relocation of the business.
170. A business may be worth more in one location than in another. If the
new location results in a less profitable and hence less valuable business, the
eminent domain action has injured the property owner in an amount equal to
the loss in value.
171. In combination, these costs represent the "opportunity costs" that the
owner has suffered.
The fact that the condemnor in an eminent domain proceeding is not
required to show that his use of the land will be more valuable than
the present owner's, but only to render compensation, will result in
inefficient land uses if required compensation is not equal to the op-
portunity costs of the land seized ....
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 42-43 (2d ed. 1977).
6MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Under the proposed interpretation of the "just compensation"
requirement, therefore, the government should assume these
costs of eminent domain. Demoralization costs, however, are
more problematic. In the power plant hypothetical, the demor-
alization costs suffered by the adjacent residents and the city's
citizens did not meet the externalities test and consequently
were not considered a cost of burning soft coal.172 The specific
demoralization costs incurred by owners of property taken by
eminent domain must be examined to determine whether they
are sufficiently "large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetiz-
able" to be includible within a government's cost/benefit
analysis.
Specific demoralization costs appear to be greater for emi-
nent domain actions than for other governmental actions.
Property owners suffer particular demoralization costs when
their property is forcibly taken from them and used for
whatever reason the government sees fit. In many instances,
however, these costs will not be sufficiently large or concrete to
meet the externalities test. In the case of owners of business
property that is taken by eminent domain, for example, the
first four categories of externalities 17 3 should amply compen-
sate for their costs. In contrast, the owner of residential prop-
erty that is taken by eminent domain suffers the additional
demoralization cost of being required to abandon a home.
These demoralization costs will increase with the length of
time that the owner has used the property as a home. For ex-
ample, the owner of a residence that has been the family home-
stead for generations will likely suffer large demoralization
costs. In addition, these costs will be as concrete and monetiz-
able as those damages compensated in any emotional distress
tort case. These demoralization costs, therefore, should be in-
cluded in the government's cost/benefit analysis and in the
owner's compensation for the taking.174 The taking of a home
owned for only a few months, or even a few years, however,
will not normally cause demoralization costs large and concrete
enough to be included within the efficiency analysis. Conse-
quently, this demoralization will not, in most instances, be a
172. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
174. The award will, in a sense, be compensating the owner for any emo-
tional distress or "exogenous preferences," which is the value a person estab-
lishes for a thing independently of the values placed on that thing by other
persons. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10
(1983) (defining exogenous preferences).
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compensible cost under the proposed efficient just compensa-
tion measure.
In all cases, however, there will be some demoralization
costs caused by the very act of taking. Moreover, the property
owner may not agree with the eventual use of the property.
Eminent domain is one of the few situations in which citizens
see the direct consequences of governmental actions that nega-
tively' 75 affect them. For example, two federal income taxpay-
ers may envision differently the government's use of their tax
monies. One who is pro-defense spending may find a "morali-
zation" benefit in thinking that the money is used to build
weapons, whereas another who is pro-social spending may find
such a benefit in thinking that the money is used to feed hun-
gry children. Either way, any moralization benefit or demorali-
zation cost of paying taxes is not directly associated with any
particular action by the government.176 The owner of property
taken by eminent domain, however, does see the direct conse-
quences of the action-the project for which the government
used eminent domain. The specific demoralization costs caused
by the taking will be amplified when the taking's outcome is
not to the owner's liking.'7T
Another incidence of demoralization costs is more direct
but rests on a more subtle foundation. Eminent domain, unlike
most other governmental actions,178 pits one person or a small
group of persons' 79 directly against the majoritarian govern-
ment. As Professor Michelman explained, an owner faces addi-
tional demoralization costs by being singled out for an eminent
domain action:
175. "Negatively" is not used in the absolute sense, but in the sense that
citizens may perceive that they are losing wealth or position from governmen-
tal action.
176. Alternatively, the taxpayers could focus on how they do not want
their monies spent. Again, however, the taxpayers will not directly observe
their money being applied to the project.
177. Of course, if the owner agreed with the use, the owner might gain a
moralization benefit. This benefit will be reflected in the owner's lack of de-
moralization costs, but it should not entitle the government to "set off' the
benefit against the other compensible costs.
178. Taxes, for example, similarly affect all people, or at least a very large
group of people.
179. Although some eminent domain actions can affect an entire neighbor-
hood, see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 MIch. 616, 304
N.W.2d 455 (1981); supra note 48, or a substantial number of persons, see supra
notes 132-50 and accompanying text, even these groups are small in compari-
son to the number of persons residing in the city where the neighborhood or
persons are located.
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If I [as a property owner] am able to mobilize my productive faculties
under the general conditions of uncertainty which prevail in the uni-
verse, why should I be paralyzed by a realization that I am at the
mercy of majorities?
*. . The defense must begin with an imputation to human actors
of a perception that the force of a majority is self-determining and
purposive, as compared with other loss-producing forces which seem
to be randomly generated .... [When the bearing of strategy is evi-
dent, one faces the risk of being systematically imposed upon, which
seems a risk of a very different order from the risk of occasional, acci-
dental injury.1 8 0
Moreover, the specific demoralization costs resulting from this
confrontation with the collective majority can be increased by
the owner's realization that the majority, and the representa-
tive system as a whole, is less likely to check abuses of eminent
domain actions than in other governmental actions.' 8 '
Although these additional demoralization costs are signifi-
cant, they are probably not sufficiently large and concrete for a
judge or jury to impute to an "ordinarily cognizable and sensi-
tive owner."':8 2 Consequently, these costs are not considered
under an efficiency analysis and are therefore not included
within an owner's efficient just compensation. These demorali-
zation costs, however, are not excluded from the efficiency
analysis because they do not exist, but rather because they are
too difficult to plug into a cost/benefit analysis. Governments,
therefore, will probably continue not to recognize these ex-
cluded costs, even though such costs will be present in most
actions.
Although requiring governments to assume costs that
should enter into their cost/benefit analysis will increase the
efficient use of eminent domain actions, the benefit of this effi-
ciency must also outweigh any additional transaction costs' 8 3
caused by awarding property owners those costs. When trans-
action costs are considered in an efficiency analysis, legal enti-
tlement should be assigned to minimize transaction costs and
thereby reach the result that best maximizes aggregate
wealth.'8 Thus, if the transaction costs of efficient just com-
pensation exceed its benefits, the added compensation should
not be awarded.
180. Michelman, supra note 163, at 1217 (emphasis in original).
181. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
183. The transaction costs would include actual attorney and court fees, de-
lay, time spent by the litigants and others, and the possibility that the deci-
sions by the court will be inefficient.
184. See supra note 166.
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Including all costs entering into the efficiency analysis
within the just compensation award should not significantly
raise the transaction costs of eminent domain lawsuits. Some
parties will already be in court litigating valuation, with ex-
perts ready to testify to market value and other losses by the
owner. In situations where the owner has agreed to the gov-
ernment's market valuation, thus avoiding litigation, the owner
may also agree to the government's offer covering all costs. In
this circumstance, including the proposed just compensation
award will have no significant impact on transaction costs. An-
other possibility is that the owner will dispute the offer,
thereby forcing a lawsuit and causing transaction costs that
would have been avoided under the current law of just compen-
sation.185 Even in this instance, however, the transaction costs
are not great enough to make the proposed just compensation
award inefficient. Although both the government and the
owner may engage in strategic bargaining, both will be aware of
the costs of litigation, and this awareness will be a deterrent to
bargaining to impasse.'1 Moreover, the greater awards of effi-
cient just compensation are justified, in part, by the inequity of
burdening the property owners with costs that the public
should bear and by the need to find some judicial limit to re-
place the ineffectual political check.18 The transaction costs
185. The lawsuit will therefore be a cost of strategic bargaining by the land
owner or the government. Strategic bargaining occurs when one or both par-
ties to a negotiation will hold out for a personal gain in excess of what would
be efficient. See A. POLINSKY, supmr note 174 at 18; suprm note 166.
186. This assumes that a party to an eminent domain lawsuit will not be
awarded attorney's fees by the court unless the party can prove that its refusal
to continue negotiations was reasonable.
187. If efficiency is a singular goal, these factors might not enter into the
weighing of the benefits of efficient just compensation. Governmental actions,
however, must also be equitable. See supra note 117. Even assuming that
most actions taken by governments under the market value measure are effi-
cient, the actions still are not equitable when they burden a minority for the
public good. As Professor William F. Baxter explained, the public must pay
when it has determined that the property is worth more to the public than to
the property owner.
[Tihe basic justification for taking the land at all is that it is more val-
uable to the community (including the owner) in the new public use
than it is to the community in the privately profitable use to which
the owner would put it. If this justification is truly available with re-
spect to a given parcel, then it follows that the community can afford
to pay the owner the market value of the land. For by assumption,
the aggregate benefits that the community has received are greater in
amount than are the marketable benefits which he could have pro-
duced by the alternative use, and those marketable benefits deter-
mine the market value of the land. The requirement of compensation
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therefore would have to be very high to cause efficient just
compensation to be inefficient, much higher than the apparent
costs of additional lawsuits when a governmental entity is al-
ready engaging in some eminent domain actions.'88
2. Externalities of Owners Whose Lands Are Not Taken
Owners whose lands are not taken incur three categories of
presently external costs from the taking of another's property
by eminent domain: loss of market value of land surrounding
the parcel taken by eminent domain; loss of current revenue by
businesses located proximately to the parcel taken; and general
demoralization costs. The first two present difficulties of prov-
ing loss from the eminent domain action and thus lack the con-
creteness necessary to be included in an efficiency analysis.189
therefore imposes a test on the good faith of members of the commu-
nity: do they really believe that the value of the land, when put to
the public use, is greater than its private value? If they do, they gain
by condemning it, even though they must pay. If they do not, they
should not condemn it.
W. BAXTER, supra note 8, at 46. The "test of good faith" that demands that the
public pay for efficient takings also demands even more strongly that the pub-
lic pay for those inefficient takings that result from the weakness of the polit-
ical check on the use of eminent domain: the corruption, unfairness, or
mistakes of elected officials and the electorate's failure to effectively or fairly
review the actions of its representatives. See, e.g., supra notes 119-50 and ac-
companying text.
188. After proposing a compensation system based on the amount the
owner of land would pay to avoid a taking, Professors Lawrence Blume and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld come to the reluctant conclusion that since the adminis-
trative costs of such a system might be prohibitive, "market value ought to be
viewed as a 'second-best' attempt to measure the appropriate level of compen-
sation." Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 131, at 620. Professor Francis also
concedes that market value is the most feasible measure of just compensation:
Perhaps we would do better simply to recognize that eminent domain
compensation serves a number of different values: the need of the
public to acquire property, the concern that the government not take
more than it needs, the protection of investment decisions, and the eq-
uitable sharing among individuals of the costs of improvements that
benefit us all.
Francis, supra note 13, at 481. This Article's proposal uses more objective cri-
teria to measure just compensation and is therefore not forced to adopt "sec-
ond-best" because of administrative costs. Moreover, the efficient just
compensation measure can better achieve the values recognized by Professor
Francis than can the market value measure.
189. Both also directly contradict current eminent domain law. The costs
invoke a concept called inverse condemnation, or de facto condemnation. The
claim is that the government's action has impaired the value of land that has
not been taken by eminent domain and that the government is therefore obli-
gated to pay just compensation. It is virtually hornbook law that a court will
not consider such claims of a proximate landowner unless the land has been
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Further, the transaction costs of identifying potential claimants
and substantiating their claims of lost market value and reve-
nues would likely be greater than any increased efficiency in
governmental uses of eminent domain.
The problem of identifying claimants and substantiating
claims will be accentuated if general demoralization costs are
compensible. Like specific demoralization costs, however, gen-
eral demoralization costs exist. When a taking occurs, citizens
see one like themselves lose property by the unilateral act of
the government. Moreover, these citizens may not agree with
the eventual use of the project. Finally, citizens may suffer
general demoralization costs by realizing that they too may
someday be pitted against the majoritarian society as a target of
an eminent domain action'9° and that, in such actions, the polit-
ical system is unlikely to provide any relief.19 ' These demorali-
zation costs will be even more acute for owners of property
proximate to that taken. Despite the potential size of these
costs, however, they lack the necessary attributes of quantifi-
able externalities and would greatly increase transaction costs
if awarded as just compensation. The general demoralization
costs, therefore, should not be included within an efficient just
compensation award.
The existence of these general demoralization costs, how-
ever, further support compensating the property owner for any
'qarge, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable" externalities.
Such compensation would decrease general demoralization
costs by decreasing the sympathy pains of others who, under
the present market value measure, recognize that property
owners are not being compensated for all their costs and who
fear that, in the same situation, they too would be inadequately
compensated. Under the proposed interpretation of "just com-
pensation," therefore, efficiency would be increased not only by
requiring the government to recognize the costs of eminent do-
main but also by reducing some of the costs resulting from such
actions.
rendered virtually valueless by the governmental action. See Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 729 F.2d 402, 405-06
(6th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 263 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. 104,
120 (1978). See generally San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. "There, but for the Grace of God, go I."
191. See supra note 120-22 and accompanying text.
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C. APPLYING THE EFFICIENT JUST COMPENSATION MEASURE:
MIDKIFF AND DUNCANVILLE
The positive effect of efficient just compensation on the ef-
ficiency and equity of eminent domain actions can be seen by
applying the award measure to the facts in Midkiff and Dun-
canville. The result in Midkiff was clearly correct under an ef-
ficient just-compensation analysis. The owners of the land
taken in Midkiff did not occupy the land and had no legal right
to occupy it for the long periods of the land leases.192 The Ha-
waii Land Reform Act of 1967 provides that compensation will
be based on market value determined as if the land acquired
were to continue to be leased for a long period of time.193 Quite
literally, the owners received everything they could have hoped
for. Moreover, the takings most likely had little general de-
moralization costs. Indeed, the ending of control of residential
land by large landholders probably had moralization benefits. 194
Midkiff is an unusual case, of course, but it is nonetheless an
example of the efficiency and equity resulting from one state's
attempt to provide full compensation.
In contrast, the amounts paid in Duncanville appear
clearly inadequate. The federal government was permitted to
externalize a significant cost of its project, the replacement cost
of the condemned dump. The efficiency of the federal govern-
ment's project is therefore suspect. Arguably, the federal gov-
ernment's project would have been redesigned or abandoned
had the decision makers been forced to consider the full costs
of acquiring the Duncanville dump. Moreover, the result in
Duncanville is certainly inequitable regardless of the merits of
the government's project. Even if the project was efficient, the
people of Duncanville should not have required to directly bear
the costs of a federal project.195
192. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
193. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 516-1(14) (1984 Supp.).
194. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
195. It might be tempting to respond to this by saying that the people of
Duncanville will benefit from the federal flood control project. It would
clearly have been efficient, to any degree that the project conferred a direct,
identifiable benefit on Duncanville, for the people of Duncanville to have
borne a proportionate share of the cost of the project. The way for the federal
government to achieve such efficiency, however, was not to undercompensate
Duncanville for the value of its dump but to bargain with Duncanville over
how the costs of the project should be apportioned.
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CONCLUSION
Efficient just compensation should provide the significant
legal check on the use of eminent domain that is now lacking.
As long as the Court chooses not to permit meaningful review
of public use claims, just compensation is the only effective con-
stitutional check on governmental exercises of eminent domain.
The just compensation requirement, however, provides few lim-
its as presently interpreted. Adoption of the efficient just com-
pensation measure here proposed will breathe life into the
requirement and once again provide a meaningful check on the
power of eminent domain. If governments are required to in-
ternalize the costs of the eminent domain actions, they should
pursue only efficient and equitable actions, at least in the ab-
sence of a breakdown of the political system. 19 6 Such a break-
down is an event that just compensation cannot prevent and
that courts are unwilling to review. The possibility of such a
breakdown and the presence of uncompensated demoralization
costs further support the awards of efficient just compensation
and outweigh any additional transaction costs caused by the
proposed measure of compensation.
196. Arguably, the efficient just compensation award will to some extent
deter inefficient actions taken because of corruption, mistake, or unfairness of
elected officials. By requiring the internalization of the costs of the eminent
domain action, there will be a greater likelihood that the voting electorate will
discover the inefficient decision and do something about it.
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